India-China: the inability to define a border

Why in the News?

• The article reflects on the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA) and the 1996 CBM agreement, which laid the foundation of India-China border management.
• Despite these agreements, the inability to define a mutually acceptable Line of Actual Control (LAC) continues to cause recurring face-offs and clashes, most recently in eastern Ladakh (2020).
• The unresolved border question remains central to India-China relations.

Background

• Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to Beijing restarted the dialogue after decades of hostility.
• Joint Working Group (JWG) (1988–1993):
  • Conducted 6 rounds of talks.
  • Led to the re-opening of consulates, resumption of border trade (1992), and institutionalisation of military-level talks.
• Swap Deal Proposal (China wanted Aksai Chin in return for recognising India’s Arunachal claims) collapsed → need for a freeze.
• 1993 BPTA signed during PM P.V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing.
• 1996 Agreement during Jiang Zemin’s visit to India → expanded CBMs, including limits on armaments and exercises.
  

Features of the Agreements

1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA)

• Border dispute to be resolved through peaceful consultations.
• Neither side is to use or threaten force.
• Respect for the Line of Actual Control (LAC); troops to withdraw if they overstepped.
• Agreement to jointly check and determine disputed segments of LAC.
• Commitment to maintain minimal forces along the LAC and reduce them on the principle of “mutual and equal security.”

1996 Agreement on CBMs

• Reaffirmed no use of force and peaceful resolution.
• Commitment to limit/reduce forces and heavy weaponry along the LAC.
• Avoid large-scale military exercises near LAC; if held, they must be directed away.
• Article X: Clarification of the LAC alignment through exchange of maps → critical for full implementation.

Challenges

• Failure to Define the LAC
• Only maps of the Central Sector were exchanged (2000).
  The 2002 exchange of Western Sector maps failed as both sides presented maximalist claims.

By 2005, the mapping process was abandoned.

• Recurring Border Face-offs
• Areas of dispute: Depsang, Pangong Tso, Demchok, Chumar, etc.
  Face-offs escalated into violent clashes (e.g., Galwan 2020).

Structural Asymmetry

• China has road access on the Tibetan plateau; Indian forces struggle with terrain logistics.
  Mutual force reduction is difficult under unequal conditions.

Erosion of Trust

• China’s violation of the 1996 agreement in Ladakh (2020) undermined CBMs.
  Agreements remain declaratory but not enforceable.

Broader Geopolitical Context

• China’s assertiveness under Xi Jinping.
• India’s closer ties with the Quad, the US, and Indo-Pacific strategy → affect bilateral trust.
  

Way Forward

• Re-initiate LAC Clarification Process: Exchange updated maps and seek joint verification to reduce ambiguity.
• Strengthen Military Protocols: Enhance hotlines, patrolling guidelines, and disengagement mechanisms to prevent skirmishes.
• Confidence-Building Measures 2.0: New agreements on drones, cyber, and surveillance near the LAC.
• Balanced Force Posture: India must continue to improve infrastructure (roads, airfields, logistics) to reduce asymmetry.
• Diplomatic Continuity: Keep the border issue compartmentalised while engaging in trade, climate, and multilateral forums.
• Institutional Mechanisms: Empower WMCC (Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination) and special representatives to regularly review border management.

Conclusion

The 1993 and 1996 agreements were historic in preventing major armed conflict for decades, but their failure to define the LAC has left the border “indeterminate” and prone to clashes.

• The 2020 Ladakh crisis shows that without clarification and mutual acceptance of boundaries, CBMs alone cannot guarantee peace.
• Moving forward, India and China must pursue a pragmatic strategy: strengthen deterrence, seek clarity on LAC, and maintain dialogue to prevent crises.
• Ultimately, stability along the border is essential for broader regional peace, economic growth, and India-China coexistence.